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The problems with the official British cost of living index (COLI) are widely recognised, 
however analysis has largely focused on the degree to which it diverges from the alternative 
indexes constructed by Stone and Rowe, Seers and Gazeley. 2 The history of the index itself 
and the reasons why it was inaccurate have been largely overlooked. Stapleford’s 
comprehensive account of the COLI in America has demonstrated the benefits to be derived 
from such a study. He highlights how ‘controversy and power have walked hand in hand 
throughout the history of the CPI’. The potential of indexation to deliver a rational, objective 
and empirical form of governance, he argues, fuelled its growing importance within the 
economy. In practice, however, ‘judgements with political valences extend all the way 
through the calculation process’. This tension meant that rather than being apolitical, the 
history of the index was fraught with political contestation.3  There are strong affinities 
between the history of the COLI in America and Britain. On each side of the Atlantic, the 
elevation of the index reflected both the ascendency of experts within government and the 
development of a more interventionist state, fuelled by wars and depression. Nevertheless, 
the evolution of the indexes was shaped by the distinctive history of each nation. This article 
seeks to examine the particular chronology of the British index by embedding the narrative of 
                                                            
1 I would like to thank Ian Gazeley, Andrew Newell, Kevin Reynolds, Ben Jones and the referees for their 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. This work was supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (RES-062-23-2054). 
2 Regarding the interwar period, Branson and Heinemann, Britain in the 1930s, p.138 and Burnett, A history of 
the cost of living, pp.306-7 conclude that it was far from accurate in this period. Aldcroft, The interwar 
economy, p.363;  Bowley, ‘Earnings and prices’; Gazeley ‘Prices in interwar Britain’; and Stone and Rowe, The 
measurement of consumers’ expenditure, p.114 find that the index was not seriously flawed.  There is wider 
agreement that inaccuracies in the COLI during the Second World War are significant. See in particular Dewey, 
War and progress, p.300 and Seers, The levelling of incomes p.13.  
3 Stapleford, The cost of living, pp.3-9. 
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its evolution within the broader economic, political and social histories of the period. It 
focuses on three key questions: what were the conditions that gave rise to its initial 
publication; how did it evolve to become one of the most important measures in the British 
economy; and why, despite its widely acknowledged inadequacies, was the COLI that was 
introduced in 1914 not modified until 1947? 
 
The only substantial work on the history of the British index is an article by Wright.4  His 
account focuses on the very earliest stages of the index and the period following the end of 
the First World War is not discussed in any detail. Wright claims that the interwar years saw 
a ‘decline in general concern about the cost-of-living index’, evinced by the delay in updating 
the basis of the index.5 This article argues that the failure to modify the index was not 
indicative of any lack of interest. Throughout this period, as the COLI assumed an immediate 
relevance to the incomes of millions of ordinary people, the issue of how it was compiled 
became increasingly contentious. So important was the COLI to the broader economy, that 
during the Second World War the stabilisation of the index became a keystone in wartime 
financial policy, necessitating a vast outlay by the state. It is therefore vital that we attend to 
this later phase of the COLI. This article, by providing a broader history of the index from its 
introduction in 1914 until 1962, when the index began to be updated on an annual basis, 
therefore addresses an important historiographical gap. Moreover, an understanding of the 
COLI helps us to contextualise wider themes in British history such as the relationship 
between class and consumption, the labour disputes of the interwar years, the development of 
economic policy during the Second World War and the fate of the postwar Labour 
government.  
                                                            
4 Wright, ‘Real wage resistance’. A short narrative is provided in Ward and Doggett, Keeping Score. 
5 Wright, ‘Real wage resistance’, p.163. 
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 Section I locates the origins of the COLI. Section II will trace how the index evolved, by the 
advent of the Second World War, into one of the most important measures in the British 
economy. As it acquired this significance, its statistical underpinnings came under sustained 
attack in the interwar period. Section III will discuss the critiques made by the state, 
statisticians, employers and labour and the reasons why the index proved so resistant to 
modification before 1936.  Section IV considers the development of the policy of stabilisation 
during the Second World War and why this retarded plans to modify the COLI.  Section V 
describes how the mounting cost of subsidies and growing public pressure led to the index 
being revised in quick succession in 1947, 1952 and 1956. The debates that had raged during 
the first half of the twentieth century over the legitimacy of the COLI were only finally 
quelled with the decision in 1962 to annually update the weights of the index. 
 
I 
The origins of the COLI lie in the establishment of the Labour Statistical Bureau within the 
Board of Trade. The economic depression of the 1880s focussed public and political attention 
on the labour problem: a growing concern about unemployment, low pay and industrial 
unrest. There was however a dearth of statistical information which might illuminate the 
dimensions of the issue. Trade unions and the Royal Statistical Society lobbied the 
government to rectify this situation and in 1886 the Labour Bureau was established. Although 
resources devoted to it were initially meagre, the transformation of the Bureau into the 
Labour Department in 1893 provided for the appointment of a team of specialised labour 
statisticians and the publication of a monthly journal, the Labour Gazette, through which 
their findings could be disseminated. Hubert Llewellyn Smith was appointed as the first 
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Commissioner for Labour and was in many ways typical of the experts that were recruited by 
the Board in this period. Often deeply involved with social reform, this group of experts 
believed that the collection and dissemination of labour statistics would provide a rational 
basis for social analysis and policy reform. However, their work was hampered by the 
financial constraints imposed on the department by the Treasury and the data collected was 
often patchy and tardy.6  The collection of cost of living statistics is a case in point.  
 
The tariff reform debate at the turn of the twentieth century created a need for comparative 
statistics on British trade and industry.7 In 1903, the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, asked 
the Board of Trade to furnish a range of information relevant to the debate, including the 
levels and rates of growth in wages in Britain and competitor nations and comparative data 
on changes in the cost of living. The Board, however, possessed very little information in 
these areas and confessed ‘we are at once embarrassed by the difficulty both of obtaining and 
of dealing with the required data.’8 The need to collect this information had been formerly 
recognised when the Labour Bureau was established, yet little progress had been made thus 
far. 9 Partly this was because of financial constraints. Resources were concentrated on aspects 
of their research that appeared to have a more immediate pertinence, such as industrial unrest, 
unemployment and hours and earnings.10 These priorities shifted in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. In addition to tariff reform, falling prices in the period preceding 1904 
meant that little attention was focussed on the concept of real wages and the cost of living. 
From 1905, prices began to creep up, rising more rapidly after 1909. In certain industries, 
such as the railways, this was not matched by any commensurate increase in pay and the 
                                                            
6 Davidson, Whitehall, pp.34-69, 79-98, 114-120.  
7 See Trentmann, Free trade nation. Agar, The government machine, pp.97-8. 
8 Consumption of Food (P.P. 1903, LXVII) p.259. 
9 Arrangements made by the Board of Trade (P.P. 1886, LXXI). 
10 Davidson, Whitehall, p.132. 
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resultant fall in real wages contributed to the wave of industrial militancy that swept through 
Britain in the immediate pre-war period.11 This pushed of the cost of living to the forefront of 
political debate.  
 
The other factor retarding the construction of a COLI, was a lack of expertise within the 
Board on index numbers. In order to rectify this, it engaged the services of two of the leading 
wage and price statisticians, Arthur Bowley and George Wood. Both were interested in 
progressive questions of social reform, however, they were also motivated by the desire to 
improve the technical quality of official statistics by the application of mathematical 
techniques to social investigation.12 In the decade preceding the First World War, a flurry of 
surveys were conducted to illuminate issues surrounding the cost of living. In 1904, a 
household  expenditure survey, involving nearly 2000 urban working class families, was 
conducted.13 This was followed by enquiries into prices and rents in 1905 and 1912 and a 
series of international studies conducted between 1908-12.14 Collectively these surveys 
provided the statistical basis necessary to compile a COLI.  In July 1914, the Board of Trade 
began to publish a monthly index in the Labour Gazette to track rising food prices. In July 
1915, the scope of the index was expanded to cover a limited range of non-food items 
commonly purchased. In this form, the official COLI prevailed unaltered until 1947.15 
[Table 1] 
[Figure 1] 
                                                            
11 Wright, ‘Real wage resistance’, pp. 156-8. 
12 Davidson, Whitehall, pp.107, 121-4. 
13 Consumption and the Cost of Food (P.P. 1905, LXXXIV). 
14 Cost of Living (P.P. 1908, CVII); Cost of Living (P.P. 1912-3, LXVI); German Towns (P.P. 1908, CVIII); 
French Towns (P.P. 1909, XCI); Belgian Towns (P.P. 1910, XCV); American Towns (P.P. 1911, LXXXVIII) 
15 TNA, Proposed Enquiry into Working-Class Expenditure, CAB/24/259/11. 
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The emergence of the COLI was part of a broader process in which the state took 
responsibility for the collection and publication of a variety of economic statistics. To achieve 
this, a group of progressive experts were recruited, motivated both by a desire to address 
social problems and to improve the quality of official statistics. The initial impetus for the 
formation of the Labour Bureau and the direction in which their efforts were focussed were 
determined to a large extent by contemporary social issues and popular political debate. After 
the turn of the century, the tariff reform debate and labour agitation around the issue of rising 
prices, made investigations into the cost of living a priority. Although some of the leading 
statisticians were recruited to the project, from a technical point of view the composition of 
the COLI was far from perfect. The index was designed to show ‘the average increase in the 
cost of maintaining unchanged the pre-war standard of living of working class families’.16 
The weights assigned to each group were therefore intended to reflect the importance of the 
items within a pre-1914 working class budget. These were derived from a number of different 
sources. The food component was drawn from the budgets collected by the Board of Trade in 
1904. The sample was far from representative. Participants were recruited by workmen’s 
organisations, co-operative societies and other individuals who were asked to obtain 
information from ‘fellow-workmen’. Families headed by skilled manual workers were over-
represented and the non-working poor and rural households were excluded from the 
sample.17  Data about rents was derived from the Board of Trade’s 1912 survey. There was, 
however, no comparable statistical data for the other types of items in the index and the 
weights for these groups were estimated from a range of other sources of dubious quality.18 
The index was therefore, at best, a rough estimation of working class spending patterns in 
1914.  
                                                            
16 ‘Cost of living index figure’ Ministry of Labour Gazette, July 1923. p.236. 
17 Gazeley and Newell, ‘Poverty in Edwardian Britain’. 
18 Gazeley, ‘Prices in interwar Britain’, p.196-7. 
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 The composition of the index also reflected certain assumptions about class and consumption: 
it imagined the working class as a homogenous group with distinct patterns of spending; the 
exclusion of alcohol from the index and the small weighting accorded to tobacco passed a 
moral judgement on what constituted legitimate expenditure for this group; and in fixing the 
index to a pre-war standard of living it inferred little expectation that this standard would 
improve. As will be discussed, the failure of the index to respond to changing patterns of 
consumption fuelled complaints as the index acquired a real pertinence to the incomes of 
millions of workers.  
II 
In the years following the advent of its publication, the COLI rapidly acquired applications 
beyond the original intentions of its designers. The first and most important of these was the 
development of formal and informal mechanisms that linked wage levels to movements in the 
index. This association developed in the conditions engendered by the First World War. The 
advent of war was accompanied by a rapid rise in prices. In the first 8 days of August 1914, 
food prices increased by nearly 15%.19 Although this rate soon subsided, prices steadily 
increased throughout the war, with inflation accelerating in 1916-17.20 Workers pressed for 
wage increases to meet the rising cost of living. The degree to which these requests were met 
varied greatly between industries. Whilst miners’ wages lagged only slightly behind price 
rises, those in the building, printing and textile industries saw their real wages fall 
considerably.21  By the beginning of 1917, most wages had failed to keep pace with inflation 
                                                            
19 Labour Gazette, September 1914, p.323. 
20 TNA, Rise in Cost of Living, MAF 60/104. 
21 Ibid. 
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and worker agitation intensified.22 The Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest was 
unequivocal in its assertion that the widening gap between wages and prices was the principal 
cause of the wave of industrial unrest that erupted in 1917.23 Given the centrality of industrial 
production to the war effort, it was imperative that swift action was taken to alleviate 
workers’ grievances. The government’s response was to use the powers bestowed by the 
1915 Munitions Act and periodically increase wages in line with the index.24  The state also 
intervened in setting wage levels in other industries not covered by the act. In 1917, the 
Minister of Labour wrote to the trade boards, urging them to revise minimum rates in line 
with the COLI.25 During the war, therefore, important precedents were set that linked wage 
levels to the index.  
 
This was formalised in the immediate postwar years by the advent of sliding scale 
agreements, which automatically adjusted wages if the COLI rose or fell by a stated number 
of points.26 The first such agreement (applying to wool and worsted workers) was reported in 
1919 and they rapidly spread to other sectors of the economy, including the railways, civil 
service, police and other public sector employees. In July 1922, the Ministry of Labour 
estimated that some 3 million workers’ wages operated according to sliding scales.27 From 
this point onwards, as the COLI fell and wages were correspondingly lowered, the practice 
was abandoned in certain industries. In July 1925, 2.5 million were covered by sliding scales; 
in 1933 1.25 million were covered, although many of these agreements had fallen into 
                                                            
22 Gregory, The last great war, p. 193. 
23 TNA,  Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, MAF 60/104, p.5. 
24 Wright ‘Real wage resistance’ p.159. 
25 Sells, The British trade board system, p.29. 
26 Sells, British wages boards pp.173-7. Report of the Ministry of Labour (P.P. XIV, 1924-5) p.323. 
27 ‘Relation of rates of wages to cost of living’, Ministry of Labour Gazette, July 1922, pp.286-287. 
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abeyance and just 0.75-1 million were in schemes that remained operational.28 Despite the 
decline of this formal mechanism, during the interwar period wage levels continued to 
broadly track the COLI and, when it began to rise from 1934, unions again pressed for 
comparative wage increases.29 By the advent of the Second World War, the expectation that 
wages should rise in line with the COLI was firmly established.  
 
In addition to wages, the COLI assumed a number of other functions during the interwar 
period. As prices continued to rise following the end of the First World War, schemes were 
introduced to vary a proportion of civil service and armed forces officers’ pensions according 
to the COLI.30 The index was also central to deliberations in setting unemployment 
assistance. In 1931, for example, the majority report of the Royal Commission on 
Unemployment Insurance used the falling COLI to justify their recommendations to cut 
levels of assistance.31 Its rise from the mid 1930s prompted calls for a corresponding increase 
in assistance from the TUC and Labour MPs, and even the suggestion that some form of 
sliding scales be applied to benefit levels. Whilst the Minister of Labour acknowledged that 
the rise in the cost of living might necessitate more generous provision, the suggestion of a 
sliding scale was rejected as impractical. 32 The COLI also influenced a whole host of other 
decisions made by government. When debating the question of the return to the gold standard 
in 1924, the impact of this decision on prices, the index and therefore wages weighed 
strongly on the deliberations of the Chamberlain-Bradbury committee.33 When, in 1929, the 
                                                            
28 Ministry of Labour Gazette, July 1922 pp.286-7, July 1925 pp.228-9, July 1933 pp.238-9. 
29 Sells, British wages boards,  pp.271-273, 124; John Dunlop, ‘The movement of real and money wage rates’, 
p.424.  
30 Pay and pensions (P.P. 1953-4, XXVI). 
31 R.C. on Unemployment Insurance, (P.P. 1930-1, XVII) pp.919, 943. Middleton, Towards the managed 
economy, pp.109-11. 
32 COLI and winter conditions, AST 7/295.  
33 Moggridge, British monetary policy, pp.38-97. 
  9
removal of duty from tea and other food stuffs was debated by parliament, discussion 
focussed on the impact this would have on the index.34 It was also central to the initial phases 
of preparation for a future war in the late 1920s. A 1929 Treasury memorandum on ‘The 
course of prices in a major war’ highlighted the dangers posed by wartime inflation. One way 
in which this could be combated, it posited, was to control the prices of items which made up 
the COLI.35 The index had become so central to the national economy that it was used as an 
indicator of the success of the government in managing the economy. A falling index 
prompted boasts from successive governments whilst sharp rises were highlighted by the 
opposition.36 In the course of the interwar years, the COLI had become one of the most 
important measures in the British economy. As it acquired this new significance, its statistical 
basis was challenged by various groups. 
 
III 
Such criticisms were fuelled by the dramatic transformation of working class consumption 
patterns since the introduction of the index in 1914. During the war, the shortage of goods, 
the implementation of rationing and the introduction of rent control meant that patterns of 
spending rapidly diverged from those proscribed by the COLI. The dramatic social changes 
of the interwar years, such as falling family sizes, the availability of new commodities, the 
growth of leisure, the electrification of homes and the development of council housing and 
working class owner occupation further exasperated the problems of a COLI which was fixed 
to prewar patterns of expenditure. Moreover, relative prices were also changing rapidly.   
                                                            
34 Hansard (Commons), vol.227 cc.1085-137, 25 April 1929. 
35 TNA, Course of Prices in a Major War, CAB 57/14; Hammond, Food, pp. 8, 97. Price control was highly 
controversial throughout the interwar period. See Rollings, ‘Whitehall and the control of prices’. 
36 See Hansard (Commons), vol.326 cc.3129-244, 28 July 1937; vol.475 cc.1019-170, 16 May 1950; ‘The cost 
of living’ in The Times 6 December 1937, p.13. The Labour Party attempted to mobilise women around the 
issue of the cost of living. Hilton, Consumerism in twentieth-century Britain, pp.108-117. 
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[Table 2] 
Movements in the index were largely determined by the price of food, which was accorded a 
weight of 60 percent. Whilst it fell sharply between 1920 and 1934, the prices of fuel and 
other items declined more gradually. Rent, which was controlled during this period, and rates 
steadily rose. These shifts in relative prices, combined with changing patterns of 
consumption, meant that the index became increasingly inaccurate across the interwar years. 
Whilst this was recognised by government, business and labour, the nature of criticisms 
depended upon whether the index was rising or falling and the benefits or disadvantages each 
group derived from these movements.  
 
The index rose steadily from 1914 to 1920, prompting the state to challenge the validity of 
the COLI. In 1917, the Select Committee on National Expenditure scrutinised the escalating 
cost of financing the war. They identified rising wages as a strong contributing factor and 
asserted that increases in the cost of living were one of the principal causes of wage agitation. 
The committee were, however, suspicious of the accuracy of the index and felt that its failure 
to take into account changing patterns of spending brought about by wartime shortages meant 
that the index was over estimating inflation and therefore wage claims. They recommended 
that an urgent enquiry be conducted to look into the issue.37 This took place in 1918 and 
Bowley, who had been instrumental in creating the index, was appointed to sit on the Sumner 
Committee. Whilst the state was motivated by the desire to reduce the costs of financing the 
war, as discussed above, Bowley had for some time been petitioning to improve the quality 
and reliability of official statistics. These motivations, for now, coincided. On the basis of 
working class budgets collected that year, the Sumner Committee concluded that whilst the 
                                                            
37 S.C. on National Expenditure, (P.P. 1918, III) pp.606-7. 
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COLI remained a satisfactory measure of price change, the use of the index to measure the 
actual cost of living ‘cannot be defended’, because of its failure to take account of changing 
patterns of consumption. Using the newly collected budgets, the enquiry suggested that the 
index had over estimated the increase in the cost of living that had occurred during the war.38  
 
Groups of employers were also critical of the index and, like the Sumner Committee, felt that 
it exaggerated the cost of living. In 1923 the Chambers of Commerce declared that this trend 
was ‘imposing a very heavy burden on industry’, ‘militating against our trade’ and causing 
spiralling inflation.39 One of the most vocal opponents in this period was Selfridges who on 
several occasions took out full page adverts in The Times to dispute the index. Describing its 
method of compilation as ‘unscientific and unreal’, Selfridges sought to present the ‘facts’ by 
demonstrating they were selling products at considerably less than the prices cited in the 
index. The official figures, they concluded, were ‘not merely inflated, erroneous, and 
untrustworthy, but … disastrous to the Nation’.40 Given the association that had been formed 
between wages and the COLI, groups of employers stood to gain financially from the 
suggestion that it was over estimating inflation as it would provide a rationale to depress 
wage levels. 
 
Whilst the government and business leaders argued that the COLI was overestimating 
inflation, labour had a different critique. Between 1920 and 1934, the index fell consistently 
and this was used as a justification for the removal of war bonuses and reduction of wages. In 
response, the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC, the Labour Party and the Cooperative 
                                                            
38 Cost of Living Committee, (P.P. 1918, VII) p.844. 
39 ‘Cost of living and wages’,  in The Times, 18 January 1923, p.12. 
40 The Times, 19 September 1921, p.5, 27 June 1924; p.12; 21 April 1931, p.12.   
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Union formed the Joint Committee on the Cost of Living in 1921. Based upon its own 
collection of family budgets, the committee made three substantive critiques of the index. 
Firstly, the operation of the Rent Restriction Acts meant that rents and rates were accorded 
too high a weight, thereby artificially depressing the index. Clothing and other items were 
underweighted and price rises more broadly had been underestimated. They argued that 
collectively these inaccuracies had resulted in the COLI considerably understating real 
increases in the cost of living and they estimated this discrepancy to be in the region of 28 
points. Not only did this mean that workers’ wages had not increased in line with prices 
during the war and immediate post-war period, but recent attempts to reduce pay represented 
a ‘serious injustice’ which will ‘depress wages below pre-war standards’.41 The 
implementation of these reductions meant that the COLI became a focus for industrial 
disputes in the early 1920s. In 1923, dockers went out in strike over plans to reduce their 
wages for a second time in response to the purported fall in the cost of living. As the dispute 
escalated, it focussed on the method by which the index figure was compiled. A deputation 
visited the Ministry of Labour’s Statistical Department to hear more about the construction of 
the index, however, this did not resolve their grievances and the dockers maintained that both 
the standard of living which the index purported to measure and the method for compiling 
prices must be reviewed.42 During this period, dockers and other groups of workers were 
dissatisfied not just with the accuracy of the index, but with the broader concept of tying their 
wage levels to a 1914 standard of living. In the latter stages of the 1921 miner’s dispute, for 
example, workers demanded an improvement upon the pre-war standard of living.43  
 
                                                            
41 Joint Committee, Final report, pp.38-9. 
42 ‘Dock strike’ in Manchester Guardian, 4 July 1923, p.9; ‘Cost of living figures’ in The Times, 23 August 
1923, p.10. 
43 ‘Cost of living’ in The Times, 19 May 1921, p.7. 
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This failure of the index to take account of the enormous transformations that occurred in 
everyday life over the interwar period was a key issue in one of the most prolonged cost of 
living disputes. In 1920, an agreement was made to link part of civil service pay to the COLI. 
however, as the index began to decline, the Civil Service Association mounted a sustained 
campaign. They had two principal criticisms. Firstly they argued that the index was designed 
as a measure of working class consumption and it was therefore inappropriate to use it to 
determine the salaries of lower middle class civil servants. They therefore petitioned for the 
construction of a separate middle class index. Moreover, they maintained that dramatic social 
changes had rendered the index a poor guide to the spending patterns of the contemporary 
working classes.44 By the mid-1930s, these short comings were broadly acknowledged. An 
investigation by the Manchester Guardian in 1934 demonstrated that the index weights were 
a poor representation of the budgets of even the lowest income groups in society.45  The 
wider application of the COLI meant that the methodological issues inherent in the index now 
had a very real impact on the incomes of millions of workers, particularly in a time of such 
rapid social, technological and economic change. As expectations of consumption increased, 
and the COLI was applied to the wages of workers from across the social spectrum, it is no 
wonder that the basic standard of living proscribed by the 1914 index attracted such ire.  
 
The methodological failings of the index also mobilised experts to publically critique the 
COLI. Bowley was highly critical of the decision not to modify the index after the Sumner 
Committee had comprehensively identified its inadequacies. In an address to the Royal 
Statistical Society in 1919, he questioned why the Committee’s conclusions had been 
ignored. Given the dramatic changes that occurred during the war in the availability of 
                                                            
44 TNA, ‘The Civil Service Joint Committee’ and ‘Memorandum on the COLI’ Lab 17/7.  
45 ‘Lancashire family budgets’ in Manchester Guardian,  9 January 1934,  p.5.  
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commodities, the index number had become ‘unreal’ and ‘absurd’. Its continued publication, 
he maintained, has caused ‘enormous and expensive mischief’. Given its relevance to the 
determination of wages, he argued, ‘much more care ought to be taken as to method and 
much better material ought to be collected, than has hitherto been the practice.’46 Over the 
next decade, Bowley continued to petition for a revision of the index and explored various 
mathematical models which might improve the validity of this vital economic measure.47 
Other progressive experts chimed in. In 1925, William Beveridge, speaking as commissioner 
for The Royal Commission on the Coal Industry, argued that the index was thoroughly 
misleading. Given the centrality of the index to wage negotiations, ‘the Ministry of Labour 
should be given whatever means necessary… to bring the index up to date.’48 The Political 
and Economic Planning group declared the index to be in ‘an advanced stage of senility’ 
whilst in The Economist John Hilton, the former Director of Statistics at the Ministry of 
Labour, argued that it ‘wheezes, and creaks at the joints, and keeps on burbling about 1914. It 
should be pensioned off and a spritely youngster put in its place.’49 When he was at the 
Ministry of Labour, Hilton had attempted to revise the index in 1926 as he felt that rising 
levels of rents had made a significant disturbance to the distribution of working class 
consumption. Despite reaching an advance stage of planning, no revision was made.50 The 
formation of the Economic Advisory Committee in 1930 enabled these criticisms to coalesce. 
Both Bowley and Hilton were appointed to this committee and in this more formal role, their 
criticisms were aired to the highest echelons of government.  In 1931 they submitted a report 
on the COLI index to cabinet. Their conclusions were unequivocal.  Given the importance of 
the index and the enormous changes that had occurred since 1904 in ways of living, they felt 
                                                            
46 Bowley, ‘The measurement of changes’, p.361. 
47 See bibliography in Allen and George, ‘Obituary’.  
48 R.C. on the Coal Industry, (P.P. 1926, XIV) p.169.  
49 Planning, 17th July 1934. Economist, 23rd December 1933, p.1235. 
50 Ward and Doggett, Keeping Score, p.139. 
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that the index had ‘more than a touch of unreality’ and recommended that a new enquiry be 
carried out as a matter of urgency in order to maintain public confidence in the index. This 
proposal was supported by the Minister of Labour and the TUC, but the National 
Confederation of Employers’ Organisations objected, citing the current economic 
instability.51 The cabinet therefore decided to defer the question, fearing it might disturb 
industrial relations.52 
 
Although motivated by different reasons, throughout the interwar period there was consensus 
amongst employers, labour, experts and the government itself that the COLI was outdated 
and needed revision. Why then was it not revised? The movement of relative prices during 
this period can provide some explanation. Prices of all items fell between 1920-34, however, 
the price of food declined considerably more than the price of non-food items. The 1914 
COLI was likely, by the interwar period, to have over weighted food. Whilst it accounted for 
60% of the 1914 index, the 1937/8 Household Expenditure Survey reported that just 38.8% of 
working class expenditure was spent on food.53 The evidence available at the time, therefore, 
suggested that if a new index was introduced that included a greater range and placed a larger 
weight on non-food items, the COLI would not have declined as sharply as it had during the 
1920s. Employers stood to gain from a falling index as it helped justify the depression of 
wages. The government were also keen to reduce wage levels as part of their broader 
economic policy and the return to the gold standard. More directly, given that the wages and 
pensions of many state employees and benefit levels were linked formally or informally to 
the index, a falling index meant considerable savings for government. In 1924, the Chancellor 
                                                            
51 TNA, Economic Advisory Council, CAB 58/147; Cabinet Conclusions, CAB 23/66/20, 25 March 1931. 
52  TNA, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, CAB 23/66/15, 18 February 1931 and CAB 23/66/22,  31 March 1931. 
53 Gazeley, ‘Prices in interwar Britain’ p.202, p.198. 
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estimated that a reduction of 5 points in the index would result in a net saving of £1,250,000 a 
year to the civil service alone.54 The COLI began to rise from 1934, thereby removing the 
incentive of financial savings to be made from a falling index. In April 1936, the government 
announced that a new survey was now being planned and would form the basis of a revised 
COLI. Again the services of outside experts, including Bowley and David Caradog Jones, 
who had recently conducted the social survey of Merseyside, were engaged to design and 
oversee the conduct of a new expenditure survey. This was conducted in 1937 and 1938, but 
before the results of this survey could be analysed, war broke out and the revisions to the 
index were put on hold for the duration.55 
 
IV 
As in the First World War, the outbreak of war in 1939 was immediately following by rapid 
increases in prices. During September, the index rose by 6 points; pressure soon began to 
build for pay increases. In October, miners petitioned for a wage rise to reflect the cost of 
living. Mine owners were amenable to this increase on the condition that the government 
allow them to increase the price of coal. This was, however, a serious problem for the 
government. An increase in coal prices would push up the COLI and encourage further wage 
demands from other industries. Yet given the strength of the mining unions and the centrality 
of coal production to the war economy, the government could not risk a dispute. It therefore 
acceded to a small increase in wages but stated explicitly that this was not awarded on 
account of rising prices, so as not to fuel demands in other industries. Nevertheless, further 
price rises in November prompted a broader round of wage demands.56 This was of great 
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concern to the government who feared the development of a vicious inflationary cycle. The 
attempt to prevent such a cycle was to dominate the planning of the war economy.57  
 
Because officials viewed inflation as a problem arising from the indexation of wages to the 
COLI, debate in the autumn of 1939 was centred on how to sever this link.58 Lord Stamp, 
chairman of the Economic Co-ordination Committee, advocated the establishment of a 
central wage authority to set rates of remuneration for all workers.59 Ernest Brown, the 
Minister of Labour, spoke strongly against such a proposal, fearing that this might ignite 
serious industrial discontent, a risk that could not be taken given the importance of industrial 
production to the war effort. He explained that whilst trade union leaders were aware of the 
dangers of an inflationary cycle, they had lobbied for the direct control of prices and not 
wages. Besides, their actions were limited by the attitude of the rank and file, in whose minds 
the association between the COLI and pay levels was now ‘firmly fixed’. 60 The Cabinet 
agreed with the Minister and decided that the Chancellor should address the National Joint 
Advisory Committee to ask for voluntary wage restraint.61   
 
The response from the trade unions was not encouraging. Walter Citrine argued that it was 
impossible to demand such a sacrifice until further attention was paid to the questions of 
profits, taxation and the redistribution of purchasing power.62 Ernest Bevin was less 
restrained. He would not ask ‘the workmen to sacrifice a penny so long as the employing 
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class was so clearly dominating... on their own terms’. The war so far, he argued, had been a 
‘wicked capitalist rump’ and ‘as our people sicken of this business they will revolt against the 
depression of their standards’. As a final flourish, he submitted a claim for a further wage 
rise.63 This was a serious obstacle to the government’s attempts to control inflation. 
Chamberlain conceded that ‘there is no doubt that we must expect persistent opposition from 
Bevin to all attempts at separating wages from the cost of living’.64 With it proving 
impossible to decouple wages from the COLI, price control now appeared the only way to 
limit inflation. 
 
Some measures had already been taken. During the autumn of 1939, the Ministry of Food had 
been running at a loss in order to limit price rises and create a favourable atmosphere in 
which negotiations with the unions could take place. 65 After the collapse of these talks in 
January 1940, the Economic Co-ordination Committee began to explore the possibility of 
subsides more fully. Such a policy, they argued, might be advantageous. If subsidies were 
concentrated on the limited range of goods in the COLI, then prices of other items would rise 
due to limited supplies, thereby increasing the revenue raised from duties.66 The cabinet 
decided that this was the best course of action in the short term, and on 31st January the 
Chancellor formerly announced the policy in the Commons. Nevertheless, he emphasised that 
this policy of stabilisation was a purely temporary measure; he would not ‘undertake an 
unlimited commitment the end of which cannot be foreseen’.67  
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 Subsidies were to gain a more permanent footing after Keynes was invited into the Treasury 
as an advisor. Since the outbreak of war, he had been lobbying for a more rigorous financial 
policy to combat inflation.68 Now within the ambit of government and, given the failing of 
the Treasury to limit inflation thus far, his ideas became more influential. Keynes advocated a 
two pronged attack on wartime inflation. Taxation and forced savings should be deployed to 
absorb excess purchasing power to control demand inflation, whilst the stabilisation of the 
price index  - and therefore wages -  would limit cost inflation.69 These measures were 
embodied by the budget of April 1941. The Chancellor made a firm commitment to hold the 
COLI at between 125-130% of prewar levels. 70  This positioned the stabilisation of the COLI 
at the heart of wartime financial policy as part of a coherent policy to combat inflation.  
 
The conditions of war had again considerably increased the importance the COLI. The rapid 
price rises it engendered threatened to spark a vicious inflationary cycle because of the 
association between wages and the index which originated in the First World War.  So 
engrained was this association and so vital was the industrial front to the war effort that 
efforts to break the link proved futile. The government instead had to rely on price controls to 
limit inflation. However, the policy of stabilisation provided fresh reasoning as to why the 
COLI shouldn’t be revised. An index that relied heavily on a limited range of foodstuffs was 
easier to control than a more varied index which reflected modern patterns of consumption. 
Indeed, a review in 1943 concluded that whilst the index was without doubt obsolete, if a 
wider range of goods was included, the true extent of wartime inflation would be revealed. It 
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would be impossible to subsidise such a range of items and would therefore ‘completely 
stultify’ stabilisation.71 As the cost of subsidies escalated, the policy began to provide a 
strong impetus to introduce a new index. 
V 
 
In the first peacetime budget, the Chancellor reaffirmed the government’s commitment to 
stabilisation. The policy, Dalton argued, was now more important than it had been in war, a 
‘sheet anchor for us in the stormy and unsettled waters of transition’. He attributed the 
absence of industrial disputes to the ‘quiet confidence of our people that they can rely on a 
firm basis for the cost of living, and for the purchasing power of the money they receive’. 
Given the priority given to production by the Attlee government, Dalton committed the 
government to hold the COLI steady throughout 1946, despite the growing cost of subsidies 
to the exchequer.72 However, the policy of stabilisation and the concentration of subsidies on 
items entering the index meant that a growing gulf had emerged between the official index, 
which had remained more or less static since 1941, and the rising prices encountered by 
consumers in shops. As shown in table 2, the war years also witnessed important shifts in 
relative prices. Whilst the COLI and food prices were held steady, the cost of fuel and other 
items rose more rapidly. Items not included in the index rose further still. Alternative 
calculations by Allen, Seers and Feinstein, based on weights derived from the 1937/8 
enquiry, indicate the degree of bias in the official index: 
[Table 3] 
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Although Dalton projected stabilisation as a means by which to maintain confidence in the 
COLI, the contradiction between the stasis of the official figure and the rising prices 
experienced by consumers meant that the index became increasingly controversial.  
 
The COLI also gained a renewed importance in the immediate postwar period. During the 
Second World War, sliding scales were adopted in industries including coal, iron, steel and 
cotton. The number of workers covered rose from 1.5 million in 1939, to 2.5 million in June 
1944. Although some of these agreements were abandoned in the postwar period, those 
covered by scales remained at 2.5 million due to the growth of industries that remained 
within the scheme, particularly building and construction.73 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the composition of the index once again became the focus of public criticism. In an article 
entitled ‘Figures can Lie’, The Daily Mirror highlighted how anachronistic the index was:  
The Edwardian working man, with his billy-cock hat, clay pipe and choker; the 
Edwardian working-class housewife, badly dressed, badly educated – these people are 
still supposed to be representative of at least 2,500,000 wage-earners in this country 
today. 
You may earn £500 a year, own a small car, cut quite a social figure in the 
neighbourhood, but if your wages are controlled by the Cost of Living Index then your 
needs, tastes, ambitions, hobbies are roughly classed as those of a coal-heaver of 
1904.74  
Due to the limited range of items included, the article argued that the index disguised the true 
rise in the cost of living. The Mirror questioned ‘What is the use of telling a man officially 
that it is costing him less to live when he knows perfectly well that it is costing him more?’ 
The index, it concluded, was ‘Whitehall flapdoodle’.75 In July 1946, the Minister of Labour 
announced his intention to convene a committee to examine the workings of the COLI. The 
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appointment of this committee, he explained, ‘is necessary to meet the growing criticism of 
the existing figure. Unless it can be seen that the matter is receiving consideration, this 
criticism is likely to grow.’76 
 
Concern was also voiced about the policy of stabilisation. Rising world food prices caused 
the cost of subsidies to escalate. By 1947 they totalled £1million a day.77 The Times 
calculated that this equated to three quarters of national debt or a third of the yield of income 
tax and urged for a reconsideration of stabilisation.78 
[Table 4] 
The increasing burden that subsidies placed upon the exchequer meant that stabilisation 
became a central issue within a far broader debate about budgetary policy and the 
mechanisms through which inflation should be contained.79 It was a debate in which the 
economic and statistical experts who had been brought into government during wartime were 
to play a prominent role. In 1940, the demands of war planning had necessitated the 
recruitment of a number of specialists from the universities who formed the Central 
Economic Intelligence Service. In 1941, the service was split to form the Economic Section 
and the Central Statistical Office. In the postwar period, both groups lobbied for the COLI to 
be revised.80 
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The Economic Section was the primary conduit for Keynesian ideology within government. 
In April 1946, Keynes warned the government that subsidies were ‘in danger of becoming the 
biggest item in the whole budget and seriously overwhelming efforts towards equilibrium’. 
He urged that they be removed and the COLI allowed to rise.81 After Keynes’ death, the issue 
was pursued by James Meade, the head of the Economic Section. He argued that ‘in present 
conditions there is much to be said for a shift in emphasis in our anti-inflationary policy away 
from too great a reliance on such direct controls as price control... and rather more onto a 
policy designed to restore the essential balance between available supplies and spendable 
funds.’82 Throughout 1946 and 1947, the Economic Section continued to argue for the 
removal of subsidies and the utilisation of fiscal policy to combat inflation.83 As the 
economic situation worsened, unlikely allies were found in the Treasury. In February 1947 it 
was calculated that the cost of stabilisation was likely to increase by £125 million on the 
previous year. The Treasury therefore urged that the stabilisation policy be modified to steady 
the level of subsidies rather than the COLI. 84  
 
However, the nature of the index left little room for manoeuvre. Because it was based on so 
few items that were by 1947 heavily subsidised, any attempts to reduce subsidies would have 
a dramatic impact on the index and wage levels. If a new index was introduced, which 
measured the prices of more items, subsidised items would carry far less weight and the 
removal of subsidies would have a less dramatic impact. The Economic Section recognised 
this and in 1946 called for a new index in order to control expenditure on subsidies.85 It was 
calculated that if the index was based on expenditure patterns derived from the 1937/8 
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survey, the effect on the COLI of removing food subsidies would be reduced from 20.5% to 
10.5%.86  The Central Statistical Office also entered the debate. Chief statistician, Jack 
Stafford, argued that the COLI was ‘thoroughly out of date and academically discredited’. It 
had become ‘an instrument of stabilisation policy rather than a measure of changes in the cost 
of living’. Revision was therefore essential.87 
 
In March 1947, the Minister of Labour announced that a new interim index was to be 
introduced that summer.88  This enabled a greater degree of latitude in stabilisation policy. In 
the April 1947 budget, Dalton announced that the introduction of the interim index must 
prompt a review of stabilisation. He warned that there was a risk of subsidies spiralling out of 
control, beholden to rising world food prices and ‘hitched to a most out of date and generally 
discredited index of the cost of living’. He announced that a ceiling of  £392 million was to 
be placed on food subsidies and that rather than aiming to hold the index steady, subsidies 
would now become a ‘stabilising influence upon the index’.89 
 
 [Table 5] 
The interim index was introduced in June 1947. Based on the expenditure patterns of the 
1937/8 budget enquiry, the weights reflected the changes in the standard of living that had 
occurred during the interwar period. There was a significant decline in the weight of the food 
component, falling from 60% of the index to 34.8% and it encompassed a far wider range of 
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items such as electricity, entertainment, travel costs, household goods, alcohol, tobacco and a 
greater diversity of foodstuffs.  
 
The introduction of the interim index did not quell public debate. Announcing the new index, 
The Daily Mirror pointed out that whilst it would be more appropriate than the 1914 index, it 
assumed that consumption patterns were the same as in 1937.90 Over the next few years, this 
assumption was frequently challenged.91 The Times, for example, gave a detailed critique of 
the ‘serious failings’ of the interim index, concluding that the authority bestowed on it was 
‘dangerous and unjustifiable’.92 The issue reached a head in the autumn of 1950. Exasperated 
by the devaluation of the pound and the onset of rearmament, prices rose steeply in 1950. 
There was, therefore, incredulity when in August 1950 the index registered a fall. Cassandra 
of The Daily Mirror crowed: 
On the whiskery index by which these things are calculated – it includes such oddities 
as the price of tin kettles (no longer made) and iron bedsteads (no longer procurable)- 
life has become easier by a reduction of 1 point...The index is of course hokum. And 
every housewife knows it is... If the cost of living is going down, then Mt. Everest is at 
the bottom of a coal mine, moles fly and eagles are dug out of the ground with a 
spade.93  
The index came under sustained criticism in the Commons throughout the autumn of 1950, 
culminating in the passing of a private members bill calling on the government to urgently 
conduct the necessary enquiries for an up-to-date retail price index.94  It was argued that 
public confidence in the index had been ‘irretrievably undermined’ and given the central role 
of the index in the economy it was essential that the Ministry of Labour act swiftly to restore 
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confidence by introducing an up-to-date index or risk industrial unrest.95 Shortly after the 
motion was tabled, the Minister of Labour reconvened the Cost of Living Advisory 
Committee and instructed them to consider whether conditions were stable enough to warrant 
a new enquiry being held to inform a new index.  
  
The Committee concluded that although conditions were far from stable, it could be many 
years before spending conditions returned to ‘normal’. Aside from the temporary post war 
abnormalities, they perceived the emergence of  longer term changes in spending habits, 
brought about by changes in the distribution of income and the introduction of social security 
schemes. It was therefore unlikely that there would be a return to pre-war patterns of 
spending and given the lack of confidence in the interim index, in 1951 the committee 
concluded that a new enquiry must be planned.96  Such an enquiry would, however, take 
several years to conduct and analyse. From a statistical point of view this was no great 
problem. Their investigations demonstrated that using weights derived from the 1937/8 had 
not resulted in any substantial inaccuracies.97 Nevertheless, they recognised that the public 
felt strongly that an index based on interwar expenditure patterns had no relevance to postwar 
conditions and if not adjusted soon, they feared, the public would come to disregard the very 
concept of the COLI.98 It was therefore imperative to consider what could be done 
immediately to restore public confidence whilst awaiting the results of the new survey.99 The 
committee concluded that ‘the substitution of a set of weights based on estimates of working-
class consumption in 1950, even though approximate in character, might go a considerable 
                                                            
95 Hansard (Commons), vol.482 cc.681-776, 8 December 1950.  
96 Interim report, (P.P. 1950-1, XI). 
97 TNA, Interim Index of Retail Prices, Lab 17/463, 6 October 1951.  
98 TNA, Committee paper 1951/5, Lab 17/463. 
99TNA, Minutes of seventh meeting, Lab 17/463, 30 October 1951.  
  27
way to restoring confidence in the accuracy of the index’.100 The interim index was therefore 
adjusted using figures derived from the series of White Papers on National Income and 
Expenditure and a survey on working class consumption conducted by the Ministry of Food. 
The modified index was introduced in February 1952. The new enquiry was conducted in 
1953/4 and from the results of this survey the new index of retail prices (RPI) was introduced 
in January 1956.   
 
VI 
This article has traced the evolution of the COLI. It emerged as part of a broader shift in 
which the state amassed increasing amounts of statistical data as it assumed a more active 
role in managing the economy and society. The demands of war accelerated this development 
and transformed the COLI from an abstract statistical measure into a index whose movements 
had massive financial ramifications. The outbreak of both World Wars were accompanied by 
rapid price rises, but because of the centrality of the industrial front, the effects of inflation 
had to be mitigated to avoid industrial strife. During the First World War, wages were linked 
formally and informally to the COLI. So engrained was this association by the advent of the 
Second World War, that attempts to decouple wages from the COLI proved futile. Instead, 
the government resorted to subsidising items entering the index and by 1950 this policy of 
stabilisation was costing more than the NHS.101  
 
The growing economic importance of the COLI had two important ramifications. Firstly, 
because of the immediate financial pertinence the index had to the incomes of millions of 
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workers and the wage bills of both private companies and the state, the method by which the 
COLI was compiled became the focus of intense popular political debate, particularly in 
periods when relative prices were changing rapidly. The intensity of the debate was enhanced 
by the dramatic economic, social and technological transformations Britain underwent in the 
first half of the twentieth century. These changes rapidly altered both patterns and 
expectations of consumption, yet until 1947 wages remained linked to the basic standard of 
living proscribed by the 1914 index. By the 1940s, this appeared simply ridiculous, as the 
Daily Mirror satirically highlighted. Such a widespread recognition of the inadequacies of the 
COLI was a serious problem given the importance of the index to delicate industrial 
negotiations. Although the lack of public confidence weighed heavy in official discussions 
about the revision of the COLI, the tremendous power wielded by the index meant that its 
modification would have massive implications for the economy. Only when such 
modifications were believed to be in the national economic interest were they made. 
 
The changing composition of the COLI speaks to wider issues of class and consumption. The 
1914 index assumed that there were distinct working class patterns of consumption and 
throughout its existence it was stressed that it only applied to this social class. When the 
index was applied to other groups of workers, such as civil servants, there were calls for the 
construction of a separate middle class index. During the postwar period, there were renewed 
requests for the construction of a separate middle class index.102 However, the Cost of Living 
Advisory Committee felt that the publication of separate indexes would be “embarrassing” 
and lead to “serious political and industrial difficulties”.103 In the aftermath of the egalitarian 
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rhetoric of war, such a flagrant acknowledgement of class difference was uncomfortable. 
Instead, they sought to construct an index which would reflect the expenditure patterns of all 
wage earners and moderate salary earners, around 90% of British households. Only those 
households where the head had a weekly income exceeding £20 and those for which 75% of 
their income was derived from a state pension or national assistance were excluded.104 With 
the exception of the wealthiest and poorest households, this assumed a greater equity and 
uniformity of consumption amongst the working and middle classes. The modifications made 
to the index also record the growth in consumption experienced during the first half of the 
twentieth century. In 1914 just 32 different items were included, by 1947 this had grown to 
49 and in 1956, the index featured 91 types of items, which were broken down into 317 
individual items for which prices were to be collected.105    
 
Such a complex index was only possible because of the development of a body of statistical 
expertise within the state. The need to amass information on the cost of living at the turn of 
the century had necessitated the recruitment of outside expertise. Motivated by the desire to 
improve the quality of government statistics, figures such as Bowley fuelled the debate about 
the COLI, through both public campaigns and in their capacity as official advisors on the 
various ad hoc committees that were appointed to review the issue. Statistical experts gained 
a more permanent footing within the government during the Second World War with the 
establishment of the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section and Social Survey.106 In 
the postwar period, these groups exerted sustained pressure for the revision of the COLI and 
were instrumental in the construction of the RPI. This ensured that it sat on a much sounder 
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methodological footing than the 1914 index and enabled its far greater complexity. Whilst the 
1904 survey had haphazardly surveyed 2000 households, in 1953/4 a geographically stratified 
survey of 13,000 households were conducted; whilst in 1904 households completed a double 
page schedule, in 1953 a household of two adults filled in 110 pages. The establishment of a 
permanent and dedicated body of statistical expertise within government also enabled steps to 
be taken to ensure the weighting of the RPI would never again become so outdated. In 1957, 
the Family Expenditure Survey was instituted as a continuous enquiry and on the basis of its 
findings, from 1962, the weights used in the Retail Price Index have been updated annually 
 
This means that the particular issues discussed in this article are largely confined to the first 
half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the ways in which the index is compiled can still 
ignite controversy.107 The decision in 2010, for example, to link benefits and pensions to the 
CPI rather than RPI provoked a widespread debate in the media about the compilation of this 
measure and formal responses from the TUC and the Royal Statistical Society.108 This debate 
highlights the continuing salience of the key themes raised in this article. Price indices wield 
tremendous economic power and modifications to the way they are compiled have massive 
financial implications. The decision to index benefits and pensions to the CPI was estimated 
to deliver annual savings of £5.8 billion by 2014/15.109  Far from being a neutral statistical 
measure, the decisions taken about how price indices are compiled remain political in nature.  
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